Harry Stack Sullivan and the lizard's tale: between "family chaos" and "creative disorder". Psychosis as dysfunctional negotiation of interpersonal need for security.
Dott. Tiziano Carbone.
VIII INTERNATIONAL FORUM OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 2014,
17-19 September, 2014 Kaunas, Lithuania
VIII INTERNATIONAL FORUM OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 2014,
17-19 September, 2014 Kaunas, Lithuania
Harry Stack Sullivan and the lizard's tail: between "family chaos" and "creative disorder".
Psychosis as dysfunctional negotiation of interpersonal need for security.
Summary
Starting from the Sullivanian concept of "need for interpersonal security," the author offers a brief excursus through infant research, mentalization theory, attachment theory, and the thought of Donnel Stern and L.W. Sander, to illustrate how the processing strategies of anxiety in the infant-caregiver dyad may lead human subjects to disfunctional negotiations with the "necessary environment": in this way humans can renounce to symbolize consciously experiences that had been pre-reflexively identified as unbearably painful.
The author describes negotiation as a continuum between the motivation of a living system to interact with its environment - co-existing with that to maintain self-organization (pre-negotiation) - and the negotiation in a subject with implicit, and later explicit mental processing skills.
In this framework, the human decision not to consciously formulate distressing relational experiences represents an evolution of coping strategies of living systems to danger: this is only a more complex procedure to escape by losing important parts - although not vital – in order to save the global consistency.
The author formulates treatment as a re-negotiation of old anxieties coping solutions that had been crystallized in a “suicide of the conscious thought”; this re-negotiation should be obtained through a new negotiation where the anxiety manifestations - in the words of Donnel Stern "family chaos”- could become "creative disorder.”
The author formulates treatment as a re-negotiation of old anxieties coping solutions that had been crystallized in a “suicide of the conscious thought”; this re-negotiation should be obtained through a new negotiation where the anxiety manifestations - in the words of Donnel Stern "family chaos”- could become "creative disorder.”
History scrapes the bottom of the
sea
like a trawl with some tears and
more than one fish escapes.
Sometimes you can meet the ectoplasm
of an escapee and it does not seem
particularly happy.
It doens’t know to be out, nobody told
it about its situation.
The others, in the trawl, think they are freer than it.
(Eugenio Montale, History)
Poets are often able to summarize concepts for
which scholars and scientists tend to develop long debates, in order to formulate
an hypothesis on how the human mind works. In the quoted poem,
Eugenio Montale describes History as a trawl, a big net that scrapes the bottom
of the sea catching fish; but, in the process, the tears in the net let some
fish escape becoming an ectoplasm, a ghostly and mysterious expression of a
dead subject; it doesn’t look very happy and is unaware to be outside the net, while
those
still in the net patronizingly look at it and think to be freer.
Borrowing the metaphor
of History as a narration of entire populations and applying it to individual stories,
we might consider them as personal narrations constructed in a social context,
such as a “trawl”, a net that captures gathering a group of people: in other
words, humans create a conscious vision of themeself and of the world within a
cultural context, maintaining their cohesion to the group and promoting cohesion
within the group. But when the narration tears, "scraping the bottom of
the sea", i.e. when some intolerable anxiety breaks in, tearing the narration/net’s
texture, some "fish" escapes.
In my opinion these expressions are a
poetic description of the fate of those preverbal experiences which, not being
collected by a communicable narration net, have not been mentalized and can take
the form of psychotic symptoms. Like those fishes escaped from the “trawl”
mentioned by Montale, they take on strange shapes, "ectoplasm of survivors,"
ghosts of characters died because of secret and distressing facts; the
“ectoplasms” do not appear to be happy and don’t know to be out of the net:
"nobody told it about its situation”.
The shareable narration can therefore be thought
either as: a factor producing consciousness in a subject who belongs to a specific
social group; a social mediated function which narrows the possibility to
recognize in individuals working outside of the shared group language “unhappy
ectoplasmatic manifestations": but they are still able to express
themselves, althought in bizarre shapes. This happens due to a painful
inability to make shareable narrations, and therefore these individuals are unaware
of being "out of the net", and this unawareness is caused by being "out
of the net."
Fishes, inside and outside the net, are
always the same. In other words, the creative unconscious activity underlying
all forms of thought - either contained in a shared language and therefore
conscious, or, having not found its place, expressing itself spectrally - is
always the same: according to Donnel
Stern (2007) "familiar chaos" and "creative disorder", are
manifestations of the same process: in the first case being influenced by a
relational climate dominated by anxiety; in the second case being influenced by
a relational atmosphere of curiosity and appreciation. The latter condition allows
the meanings to emergence in a conscious shared, because shareable, language.
But if the net is a metaphor for conscience,
what is the tear?
In
the opinion of many scholars from different fields of science, neuroscience,
cognitive psychology, complex systems theory (Liotti, 2003, Tronick, 2008),
conscience is a human subject’s function prepared by less complex levels of
organization and emergent in social interaction. Liotti (Liotti, 2003, p. 18), quoting
studies of contemporary neuropsychology, says that conscience “is an
intrinsically relational phenomenon, continually emerging in the communication
between individual brain and the world, rather than a brain’s private property.”
In a similar way, discussing the concept
of dyadic expansion of states of conscience, Tronick describes how mother-child
interactions build states of conscience in both (Tronick, 2008, p. 241).
My theory is that socio-emotional exchanges between
mother and child (and between all human beings) have the potential to expand
the state of conscience of the individual, resulting in powerful consequences
in terms of experience and development. The hypothesis of conscience dynamic
expansion comes from the systems theory. One of the fundamental principles of
the latter is that open biological systems, such as humans, work to incorporate
and integrate increasing amounts of valuable information in more coherent
states. ... This process is often considered as a characteristic self-generated
by the systems, meaning that all systems are self-organizing. In fact, the
systems are self-organizing, but equally it is important to emphasize that, in
humans this is a dyadic process, involving two minds.
The process of interaction and mutual influence between two o
more individuals is defined as a “negotiation” by a number of relevant relational
authors such as Stephen Mitchell (1995), Lewis Aron (2004), Stuart Pizer (1998)
and by some infant research authors such as Louis Sander (2007), Beatrice Beebe
and Frank M. Lachmann (2003).
Sander uses the word
"negotiation" to describe exchanges either between living systems at
elementary levels, (Sander, 2007, pag XXVIII)
or between mother and infant in the early interactions, (Sander, 2007, p. 5)
examined longitudinally in the first 20 months to see how some co-constructed sequences
become stable patterns of behavior of the child.
Evaluating interactions, we have tried to catch these relationships by
representing the achievement of this point in the form of negotiation of issues
concerning the interaction. (…) The issue should be negotiated when the baby’s expectancy crystallizes. (Sander,
2007, p. 8)
So, we can say that negotiation plays a fundamental
role in shaping living systems from the very beginning. We can presume that it
works in a continuum between elementary levels, where it simply mean the
tendency of living systems to put together self–organization and interaction with
environment to reach more coherent states, which I would refer to as “pre-negotiation”
(Carbone T, 2005), and more complex levels, where negotiation becomes the
activity implemented by human subjects relating with others. Negotiation occurs
at implicit and explicit levels of mental
processing.
If possible outcomes of negotiations in a
particular relational climate affects the subject’s foresight patterns, forcing
him/her to leave holes in construction of the “net”/conscience process (is trauma
the implicit order not to formulate conscious meanings?), I think it is possible
to consider psychotic thought’s processes as the result of dysfunctional
negotiations, deriving from an implicit commitment not to formulate a conscious
meaning of some specific relational
situations.
Montale says, "nobody told it about its situation": these
words seem to suggest that being able to talk about “broken net” with
"escaped fishes”, allows “family chaos” to become “creative disorder”,
rinegotiating shareable narrations in a climate where old anxieties are held.
This would allow to “mend the net” of
conscience in which it could be possible to give space and definition to "unformulated
experiences".
If we assume that the net is conscience,
tears are discontinuities co-constructed by individuals and social environment,
what is the "motive"? Why does negotiation become dysfunctional in
view of the fact that: “there is an intrinsic biological tendency or “factor”
in the organism, which is directed toward maintaining or achieving mental health”.
(Sullivan, 1940, p. 269)
In Harry Stack Sullivan’s thought, the need
not to experience anxiety, namely the need for interpersonal security, is a
main infant’s motivation in relation with the parent, and it is distinct from
the needs belonging to "bodily organization" (Sullivan, 1940). Rather,
it pertains a cultural dimension, including every social relationship.
On the other hand, the pursuit of
security pertains rather more closely to man’s cultural equipmment than to his
bodily organization. By “cultural” I mean what the anthropologist means-all
that which is man-made, which survives as monument to preexistent man, that is
cultural. And as I say, all those movements, actions, speech, thoughts,
reveries and so on which pertain more to culture which has been imbedded in a
particular individual than to the organization of his tissues and glands, is
apt to belong in this classification of the pursuit of security (Sullivan,
1940, p. 13).
This fundamental theme of Sullivan’s thought
is very important to understand psychotic mental functioning and experience,
because it explains how infant-environment negotiations are crucial because dissociation
occurs.
Very intense anxiety precipitated by a sudden,
intense, negative emotional reaction on the part of the significative
environment……. tend to erase any possibility of elaborating the exat circustances
of its occurence, and about the most the person can remember in retrospect is a
somewhat fenestrated account of the
immediate neighborhood… All this almost undifferentiated, sudden, violent
anxiety is experienced as uncanny
emotion….. In later life, this all-encompassing anxiety shows some slight
elaborations, which are hinted at by four words in our language-awe, dread,
loathing, and horror. (Sullivan, 1953, p. 314-15)
For Sullivan, "seminal author for
modern relational perspectives and attachment" (Albasi, 2006, p. 127), the
critical steps in shaping subject’s conscience are played entirely in the
relationship between infant and care-giver.
The fate of the experiences - whether they
can be processed into conscious experiences or not - is marked by the amount of
anxiety that child's behavior produces in the caregiver; in fact, according to
Sullivan, a source of intolerable anxiety in the caregiver is empathically perceived
by the child and experienced as "a blow
on the head" (Sullivan, 1953, p. 314). This event can disrupt the
experience, and “cut off foresight” (Sullivan, 1953, p. 44) leaving space only
to “awe, dread, loathing, and horror” to be experienced in later life: in this
way, every conscious elaboration is prevented.
The process takes place within levels of
experience defined by Sullivan as prototaxic and parataxic, incorporated and
developed by later writers such as Ruth Lyons in the concept of
"procedural knowledge," or "implicit relational knowing",
(Lyons-Ruth, 1998) or as in Beebe-Lackmann "model of experience”.
Beebe-Lackmann (Beebe-Lackmann, 2002, p.
12) say: “Early childhood experiential models are organized as sequences of
mutual exchange expectations and are associated with particular self-regulatory
styles”.
Therefore "security operations"
described by Sullivan as a lack of processing, which we could also refer to as a
kind of marking to prevent access to conscience, could be considered as a self-regulatory
style in which the infant, at an implicit procedural level, "decides"
to sacrifice conscious symbolization of distressing interactions with the
adult, in order to preserve the relationship with him/her. They can range from "selective
inattention" - by which interactions may also become conscious, but cannot
be undestood in their implications, being
the subject not able to grasp them - to real "dissociation".
The sacrifice of a non-vital but
important piece of a living system is not new in the world of living organisms,
in order to save life. According to the logic of complex systems (Sander, 2007),
in less complex levels, systems pursue the state of wholeness looking for the
maximum level of coherence in a constant equilibrium with environmental stresses.
For example, a lizard attacked by a predator can leave the tail in the mouth of
the latter as a strategy to save its life.
From an evolutionarily point of view, this
behavior is very effective to preserve the organism and its species.
In the development of the interaction, there is always the perception of one’s
one and others’ state, also useful to describe the flow of energy through the
individual-environment living system. (...) The state of wholeness becomes the motivational push, as a crucial impetus to
try to regain the coherence in a creative organizating process as the
individual is more engaged in an ever-increasing complexity of involvement with
the environment (Sander, 2007, p XVIII).
The child-caregiver self-adjusting system aims
at the child/future adult’s dissociation/psychosis, because the relationship prevents
some aspects of the interaction from being processed in their implications at
the conscious level. Mentalization about specific issues, like lizard’s tail, must
be sacrificed (a partial suicide) in order to secure a more important priority.
The interpersonal security ensued by preserving the relationship with the
caregiver is the reason why the infant “decides” that some well-identified
experiences shall not be communicable. This is a security operation of the
subject and of the group, whose coherences could blow up if some relationship implications
underwent conscious processing. Thus, dysfunctional negotiations shape the subject’s
conscious self-representation repertoire, and the latter will be actively
pursued as one’s conscious identity.
Sullivan describes the “dynamism” through
which some experiences will become “not-me”(Sullivan, 1952, p. 161) - the part
of the personality outside of the conscience of the subject, being not approved
by parents - as the result of a kind of
inertia, for which one would focus only on known interactions. Thus, due to an
impersonal mechanism, every innovation would have no chance of entering the
conscience; the author does not explain the selectivity of the proto-parataxic experiences
- that do not reach consciousness - in terms of a person who "decides what
to avoid."
But, at this point, we should ask ourselves:
if the purpose is to avoid the unknown and there are no clear indications in
the mind such as "danger, already seen, do not go on", this avoidance
should be indiscriminate. But the “diversionary maneuvers” implemented by
psychotic patients, in order to avoid "dangerous issues" and avoid to
experience “awe, dread, loathing, and horror”, are not at all generic: psychotic
patients do not avoid new experiences in general, but they avert them in
specific areas which they do not consciously know: they cannot formulate any
meaning, but a dangerous approach to “hot spots” is invariably marked by the
emergence or increase of delirium: it happens as if the experiential meanings were
known, feared and therefore avoided. The subject is not conventionally conscious:
paraphrasing Donnel Stern "experience is unformulated," but
procedurally s/he knows what it is better not to elaborate and allow to become
conventionally conscious. S/he already knows, but s/he can not say it to
him/herself in the group’s language. S/he doesn’t formulate what s/he knows
that must not be formulated.
In the words of Sullivan, subject would be
divided into a conscious part,“good-me” and “bad me”, and an unconscious one,
the "not-me": the conscious self is the result of approved or not
overtly criticized interactions by the parents, while the not conscious self is
the part that caused strong adversion, and therefore anxiety, in the parent. “Not-me,”
with associated proto- parataxic experiences, does’t not disappear, but it is
manifested in projections, enactements, and it is out of the conscience of the
subject. Therefore it would seem that in Sullivan’s theory, there is a subject -
not impersonal instances, - although not conscious in verbal shared modalities.
At this point, the matter becomes confused
because it is not possible to understand if an impersonal force or a subject,
no matter how unconscious, decides.
Sullivan arrives to a paradox by saying
that dissociation causes conscience to keep
actively out of conscience some part of one’s living: this is how to say
that it keeps out itself.
Dissociation can easily mistaken for
a really quite magical business in which you fling something of you out into
outer darkness, where it reposes for years, quite peacefully. That is a
fantastic oversimplification. Dissociation works very suavely indeed as a long
as it works…it works by a continuus
alertness or vigilance of awareness, with certain supplementary processes which
prevent one’s ever discovering the usually quite clear evidences that part of
one’s living is done without any awareness. ( Sullivan 1953, p. 318)
Sullivan could not rely on current
neuroscience knowledge about implicit and explicit processing systems, but when
he speaks the first time about awareness in the above quoted phrase about the
effects of dissociation on conscience, he seems to refer to an implicit
unconscious awareness, working with strange means (supplementary processes) in
order to secure that some part of one’s living will not reach classic
awareness.
I think that Sullivan was trying to explain
– with the tools that were available at the time - what every clinician dealing with psychotic
patients experiences; i.e. the feeling that the patients know much more than they
tell us, or tell themselves. They are afraid of the consequences caused by knowing.
So clinicians must say that patients, somehow intentionally, hold something
outside the field of consciousness, but the words available in the shared
language are insufficient to describe, and contradictions and paradoxes appear.
All these aspects represent an important
theoretical issue, object of heated debate (for a review see Stern, p. 232) i.e,
in Sullivan’s words, the relationship between proto-parataxic (pre-verbal unconscious)
and syntaxic experiences (verbal shared conscious).
About this issue, Donnell Stern critically notes
how Sullivan believes that proto-parataxic experiences can be uniquely translated
into verbal form.
But Sullivan also seems to believe, along with most other theorists of
his time, that there is an exact correspondence between the parataxic meaning and
language that could be used to express it, i.e., parataxic experiences can be
validly formulated only in one way . It's an unconscious experience, such as
the contents of the Freudian unconscious, which simply has to be combined with
verbal labels in order to get to the conscious dimension. (Stern, 2003, p. 99)
Donnell Stern, on the
contrary, thinks:
The parataxic meaning is therefore unknown even to ourselves, and insight
is not simply a matter of learning what we already know. The parataxic meaning does
not exist in some areas of the mind in which it barricaded itself; rather it
has never been formulated. As we don’t trust the unknown, fearing it could
threaten our security in the future, we are not particularly inclined to simbolize
the new experience in consensually validated terms. (D. Stern, 2003, p.95)
I think that this antithesis between a correspondentist
and a constructivist-hermeneutic position is an expression of the difficulties
in formulating a theory of the subject that considers a continuity between
levels of organization of living systems, from the biological to the self-conscious
one; in my opinion this represents a persistence of the problems introduced by
Cartesian dualism.
In essence, an arbitrary separation is
assumed to exist between a part of the subject able to say "I am me"
(res cogitans), and a non- thinking, unconscious part, (res extensa), which are separated by an
unbridgeable gap. The conscious subject is the only interpreter who is capable
of speech, but convicted to a mere hermeneutic exercise without even being remotely
able to access the experiences that
found its own being.
The problem is tackled by Egdar Morin, (Morin
E, 1981, p. 270) scholar with multiple skills (Doctor of History, Sociology,
Economics, Philosophy and Law) but for the purpose of this work illuminating as
an expert in complex systems, who states that being a subject able to say "I am
me", is implied since the first
levels of living systems:
Now we come to the concept of the subject ... emerged in watermark in the
scientific field of immunology (..) immunology has been forced to rely on the
idea of the self/non-self opposition: this distinction "self/non-self"
is thus a distinction of cognitive nature. ( ... )
The specific aspect of every living organization... is its cognitive
dimension, inseparable from organization.
Now the bacterium lives, organizes itself, with evidence, by itself and
for itself ... but this "computation per
se" can be called self-centered, if one gives to this word a strictly
literal sense: "I am the center of my world in order to deal with it” (..)
OneYou can then say "computo
ergo sum,"only in the first person. "I exist as a subject."
Thus, the “soggetto referente unitario” (unitary
referent subject) (Minolli, 1993) can be thought as a continuum in which the
"res extensa" is already
fully subjective and source of the emergence of consciousness, the "res cogitans". In the words of
Morin:
The error, the illusion of metaphysics, was to believe that there was a
notion of inseparability between the subject and the notion of consciousness, but
consciousness is the ultimate efflorescence
of subjectivity, as far as we currently know
(Morin, 1981,
p. 272)
So, from the most basic levels of
organization, the subject develops ever more advanced functions in the
"computation" of interactions: these functions are the subject’s expressions,
develop along a not dissectable continuum and emerge from an ongoing
negotiation between autopoiesis and social interaction. The separation between
cognitive functions that found “implicit consciousness”
from those that underly explicit conscience is artificial, being the second always
"decided" by the first. In a sort of "reversal of powers"
between "Secretariat" and "Directorate-General", the contents
that must or can get to explicit conscience are continually selected by the implicit
“consciousness”, as amply suggested by Donnel Stern when he describes how every
creative aspect of thought, such as every important development in therapy,
appears to conscience from unconscious as a surprise, despite it sounds like
something always known, thus causing the
"shock of recognition" (Stern, 2007, p. 121)
The effective surprise distinguishes the symbolization of the experience,
the creative use of language, the flourishing of the explicit meaning. The
formulation of the experience is a mystery; it really belongs to us more than
we can belong to anything else, but we are not able to control it. It produces in us the feeling of recognition, the shock of
recognition, because we've seen it before in the amorphous, parataxic form that
we experience in our feelings of intentionality.
So the experience only seems to have been
translated into a conscious verbal meaning, but its parataxic form had already been
"seen", although in a different way: if it had been seen, it must
have produced a memory in the mind. Stern seems to contradict his earlier
statement when he says: "parataxic meaning does not exist in some areas of
the mind in which it barricaded itself". Certainly, it had never been
consciously formulated, but I think there is a problem of language: why can we speak
of subject "formulations" - symbolic
productions corresponding to an idea causing a specific behavior about a given
topic - only at explicit level? Cannot an esplicit conscious thought/formulation
simply be considered as one of the possible manifestations of thought,
"the last efflorescence" that an underlying unconscious thought/formulation
produces?
Based on Stern’s studies on unsymbolized
experiences, (Stern, 2007, p. 95) dissociated experiences in psychosis should
be simply unknown too: on the contrary, we must say that psychotic patients
avoid well-known experiences, which are symbolized, processed at preverbal
unconscious levels, prevented from accessing conventional conscience and
actively maintained in such state, in order to respect the “status quo”, the coherence
of the subject and of the social group.
So, one does not avoid new issues, one
avoids disfunctionally old isues, and dysfunctional patterns go on because some
aspects of the thought cannot “go through customs” towards shareable language: in
such a condition, they continue to work and generate meanings in a spectral mode, perpetuating
"family chaos"(Stern, 2007, p. 86). The appearence of some thoughts
in the coscience is the result of what subjects at implicit levels negotiate to
be knowable at the explicit level: this is only a particular form of
consciousness processes, shared because shareable by the group. If we had to
restrict conscience to this communicable self-reflexive manifestation, we should say that conscience ignores itself.
Borrowing Morin’s words:
One could argue that it is strange that our knowledge ignores itself.
Yes, it's very strange: our knowledge ignores much of itself, it comes from a
background of unconsciousness and grows through the unconscious processes. (….)
In fact, when we say “I think”, this implicitly means "I think that I
think," and it is clear that "I think" is a reflective operation
that separates itself from the fact that 'I think'.
But explicit conscience is not at all the full
expression of the whole subject, and perhaps not even the most conscious part of
the subject; it is just a final “efflorescence”, whose emergence modalities will
be decided in the negotiations between human subjects in the implicit consciousness
level. Therefore, conscience may present discontinuities (Liotti, G. 2003),
while the "computing" manifestations of human subjects defined as unconscious,
including the "spectral psychotic” ones, do not present discontinuities:
the subject continues to process them, and they look strange just because some “meshes
of the net”, the group’s shareable code, the so-called conscience, have
succumbed. To use the words of Montale "they are out the trawl".
But they are not less free, they are just
waiting for more favorable conditions to go back to communicable forms, to be
integrated. This process of looking for
and pursuing more favorable conditions, seems not to be governed by esplicit
levels: “familiary chaos” becomes “creative disorder” and generates conscious
meanings only if something at implicit level has changed, allowing something
new to flourish in conscience.
In the opinion of some authors like Lyons
Ruth, Tronick, Sletvold (Svetvold J, 2014) therapeutic effectiveness does not
depend on interpretations but on “something more.” Tronick argues that
therapeutic change depends on “dyadic states of conscience”, which are essentially
emotional and procedural co-creations, in other words implicit negotiations: “they
give impetus to change the mental organization of the patient, thus offering that
“something more.” (Tronik E, 2008, p. 247)
In a similar way, Jon Svetvold speaks of
“embodied self-experience” and “embodied intersubjectivity” to explain clinical
interaction, whose effectiveness is not determined by explicit experience (Svetvold
, 2014, pag. XV).
So, in my use, a meeting of two (embodied) subjectivities, for example analyst and patient, can be
characterized either by a low or a high degree of (embodied) intersubjectivity, understood as a low or
high degree of shared experience and mutual recognition.
The ability to experience both similarities and differences between our
body states and those of others constitutes the basis for the registration of
significant affective experiences that emerge in a relationship. These
registrations take place without the involvement of reflective thought or traditional
forms of symbolic representation. These nonverbalized registrations, I will
argue, are critical for our ability to navigate analytic interaction.
They are implicit, unconscious or
“unformulated” experiences, resembling those occuring in infants that
sacrifices some areas of possible future conscious thought - the lizard’s tale
- in order to secure the attachment to the parent.
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